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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
BECKER, Chief Judge. 
 
This case requires us to interpret two insurance policies 
to determine whether the insurers had a duty to defend the 
insured against a lawsuit brought by a competitor for theft 
of trade secrets, unfair competition, and reverse passing off. 
The policies covered claims against the insured for 
"advertising injury." The definition of"advertising injury" in 
standard business insurance policies has troubled and in 
some cases confounded courts for years. This case involves 
allegations that the insured stole various ideas and then 
advertised the results of that theft; the question is whether 
the advertising converts the theft into "advertising injury." 
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We conclude that it does not, and that, by the plain terms 
of the policies, the insurers had no duty to defend against 
such claims. We also rule that the insured cannot maintain 
actions for bad-faith denial of coverage against them. We 
therefore affirm the District Court's order granting 
summary judgment to the principal insurer, Travelers 
Indemnity Co. (named as "Travelers Insurance Co." in the 
caption) ("Travelers"), and its Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) order 
dismissing the insured's complaint against the excess 
carrier, United States Fire Insurance Co. ("USFIC"). 
 
I. Facts and Procedural History 
 
Plaintiff is The Frog, Switch & Manufacturing Co. 
("Frog"), a manufacturer of industrial products. Defendants 
are Travelers and USFIC, which issued insurance policies 
to Frog that are identically worded in relevant part. 
Travelers issued a basic policy with an advertising injury 
limit of $1,000,000, and USFIC issued an excess policy that 
covered claims that exceeded the retained limit. Under the 
policies, the insurance companies agreed to pay sums that 
Frog became legally obligated to pay as damages for 
"advertising injury" "caused by an offense committed in the 
course of advertising your goods, products, and services." 
"Advertising injury" was defined as, inter alia, "injury that 
arises out of your advertising activity as a result of: . . . (3) 
misappropriation of advertising ideas or style of doing 
business." The policies further provided that the insurance 
companies had the right and duty to defend against any 
suit seeking damages covered by their policies. 
 
On July 17, 1995, a Frog competitor, ESCO, filed suit 
against Frog and one of Frog's employees, John Olds. ESCO 
alleged that, in January 1995, it had acquired a dipper 
bucket product line from Amsco Cast Products, Inc. 
("Amsco"), including Amsco's trade name, trademarks, and 
copyrights. The complaint (hereinafter "the underlying 
complaint") maintained that, prior to ESCO's acquisition of 
Amsco, Olds--who had been Amsco's chief engineer for the 
dipper bucket product line--misappropriated from Amsco 
trade secrets and confidential business information, 
including drawings and prints related to the dipper bucket 
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product line and delivered that information to his new 
employer, Frog. 
 
ESCO also alleged that Frog then entered the dipper 
bucket product market, using Amsco's proprietary trade 
secrets, confidential business information, and technology 
misappropriated by Olds. The complaint asserted that Frog 
had engaged in unfair competition based on the 
misappropriated information. ESCO's Revised Second 
Amended Complaint also added two causes of action for 
false advertising and reverse passing off under the Lanham 
Act, 15 U.S.C. S 1125(a), which prohibits false or 
misleading descriptions of fact in commercial advertising 
and promotion. 
 
The relevant paragraphs of Count Nine, "False 
Advertising Under Lanham Act," are as follows: 
 
       76. Shortly after Olds became employed by Frog 
       commencing October 17, 1994, defendant Frog 
       launched a promotional campaign to the market for all 
       cast manganese dipper buckets. This campaign 
       included widespread distribution of a product 
       promotional brochure, publication in an industry trade 
       journal, and verbal and written direct communication 
       to customers. In this campaign, defendant Frog falsely 
       represented that it had developed a new and 
       "revolutionary" design for dipper bucket parts and 
       components, and falsely depicted a dipper bucket with 
       a "Frog, Switch" logo. 
 
       77. In fact, at the time of defendant Frog's campaign, 
       it had done no design work whatsoever, and the parts 
       and components Frog was offering for sale and was 
       selling were made from engineering drawings 
       unlawfully appropriated by Olds from Amsco and used 
       by Frog. The market was falsely led to believe that 
       products of the type contained in the Amsco line could 
       readily be replicated, produced and sold by Frog. 
 
       78. Plaintiffs have been damaged by defendant Frog's 
       actions in an amount to be proved at trial. 
 
Count Ten, "Reverse Passing Off Under Lanham Act," 
alleged in relevant part: 
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       81. The parts and components sold in commerce by 
       defendant Frog as its own were really Amsco products 
       made by use of the stolen drawings, a form of "reverse 
       passing off." 
 
       82. Plaintiffs have been damaged by defendant Frog's 
       actions in an amount to be proved at trial. 
 
Frog timely gave Travelers and USFIC notice of the ESCO 
litigation and copies of the complaint and the amended 
complaint, and requested that the insurance companies 
defend the suit, on the grounds that the ESCO complaint 
alleged acts that were potentially covered by the insurance 
policies. Both Travelers and USFIC refused. On June 5, 
1997, prior to trial, Frog and ESCO settled for $2,625,000. 
 
Frog sued the insurance companies for breach of contract 
and for bad faith in failing to honor the insurance policy 
under 42 Pa. Stat. Ann. S 8371. The District Court granted 
summary judgment to Travelers and granted USFIC's 
12(b)(6) motion to dismiss.1 
 
II. The Duty to Defend 
 
A. General Principles 
 
The parties agree that the insurance contracts are 
governed by Pennsylvania law. The policy was issued by a 
Pennsylvania agent to a Pennsylvania corporation. See 
Travelers Indem. Co. v. Fantozzi ex rel. Fantozzi, 825 F. 
Supp. 80, 84 (E.D. Pa. 1993) (Pennsylvania conflict of laws 
principles dictate that an insurance contract is guided by 
the law of the state in which it is delivered). 
 
General rules of insurance contract construction require 
us to read the policy as a whole and construe it according 
to its plain meaning. See Atlantic Mut. Ins. Co. v. Brotech 
Corp., 857 F. Supp. 423, 427 (E.D. Pa. 1994), aff'd, 60 
F.3d 813 (3d Cir. 1995). Ambiguities must be construed in 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. We treat the insurers together despite the differing procedural 
background. A 12(b)(6) motion may be granted where the insurance 
contract unambiguously reveals that an insured is not entitled to 
coverage. See Bartley v. National Union Fire Ins. Co., 824 F. Supp. 624 
(N.D. Tex. 1992). 
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favor of the insured because the insurer writes the 
contract, but a provision is ambiguous only if reasonable 
people could, in the context of the entire policy, fairly 
ascribe differing meanings to it. See id. 
 
We need only examine the insurer's duty to defend to 
resolve this appeal. An insurer's duty to defend an insured 
in litigation is broader than the duty to indemnify, in that 
the former duty arises whenever an underlying complaint 
may "potentially" come within the insurance coverage. See 
Erie Ins. Exch. v. Claypoole, 673 A.2d 348, 355 (Pa. Super. 
Ct. 1996). Furthermore, if a single claim in a multiclaim 
lawsuit is potentially covered, the insurer must defend all 
claims until there is no possibility that the underlying 
plaintiff could recover on a covered claim. See Erie Ins. 
Exch. v. Transamerica Ins. Co., 533 A.2d 1363, 1368 (Pa. 
1987). It follows that there may be a duty to defend without 
a duty to indemnify. See Aetna Life & Cas. Co. v. 
Barthelmy, 836 F. Supp. 231 (M.D. Pa. 1993), rev'd on other 
grounds, 33 F.3d 189 (3d Cir. 1994). In determining the 
existence of a duty to defend, the factual allegations of the 
underlying complaint against the insured are to be taken as 
true and liberally construed in favor of the insured. See 
Biborosch v. Transamerica Ins. Co., 603 A.2d 1050, 1052 
(Pa. Super. Ct. 1992). 
 
Relying on Safeguard Scientifics, Inc. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. 
Co., 766 F. Supp. 324, 330 (E.D. 1991), Frog argues that 
the duty to defend also arises if the underlying complaint 
could reasonably be amended to state a claim under the 
policy. Safeguard Scientific's formulation of the duty to 
defend applies in a particular situation--when the 
underlying complaint alleges intentional action, but 
negligent or reckless action would suffice to make the 
insured's conduct actionable--and is merely a way of 
saying that such a complaint "potentially" comes within the 
insurance coverage.2 At all events, Frog argues that the 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. More specifically, Safeguard Scientifics holds that the insured should 
not be dependent on the underlying plaintiff 's pleading on state of mind, 
which may be inapt. When a complaint alleges intentional misconduct 
(which insurance policies exclude from coverage) but might be amended 
to allege some other state of mind that would both trigger coverage and 
show liability, then the complaint should be treated as setting forth 
facts 
that potentially justify coverage. See Safeguard Scientifics, 766 F. Supp. 
at 329-30. This rule reflects the way that the complaint will actually be 
treated in the courts during the underlying litigation. 
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ESCO complaint, either initially or in amended form, did in 
fact allege injury covered by the policy. 
 
B. Covered Advertising Injuries 
 
The policies at issue here define advertising injury to 
cover four specific categories: (1) slander, libel, or 
disparagement of goods, products, or services; (2) violation 
of a right of privacy; (3) misappropriation of advertising 
ideas or style of doing business; and (4) infringement of 
copyright, title, or slogan. This is standard language for 
defining advertising injury in commercial general liability 
policies. See Lee R. Russ & Thomas F. Segalla, 9 Couch on 
Insurance 3d S 129:25 (1997). The applicability of these 
categories to a variety of torts has been the subject of 
numerous cases in federal courts. With varying degrees of 
success, insured parties have sought coverage for the 
underlyingactions of patent infringement,3  trademark or 
trade dress infringement,4 misappropriation of trade secrets 
or other confidential information,5 and actions alleging 
harm to consumers rather than competitors.6 Here, Frog 
seeks coverage based on allegations that it engaged in 
unfair competition by using misappropriated information 
and false advertising and reverse passing off under the 
Lanham Act. 
 
We commence our discussion with some analysis of 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
3. See, e.g., Elan Pharmaceutical Research Corp., 144 F.3d 1372 (11th 
Cir. 1998); Iolab Corp. v. Seaboard Surety Co. , 15 F.3d 1500 (9th Cir. 
1994); Atlantic Mutual Ins. Co. v. Brotech Corp. , 857 F. Supp. 423 (E.D. 
Pa. 1994), aff 'd, 60 F.3d 813 (3d Cir. 1995); Gencor Indus., Inc. v. 
Wausau Underwriters Ins. Co., 857 F. Supp. 1560 (M.D. Fla. 1994); 
National Union Fire Ins. Co. v. Siliconix, Inc., 729 F. Supp. 77 (N.D. 
Cal. 
1989). 
 
4. See, e.g., Advance Watch Co. Ltd v. Kemper Nat'l Ins. Co., 99 F.3d 795 
(6th Cir. 1996); Union Ins. Co. v. The Knife Co., 897 F. Supp. 1213 (W.D. 
Ark. 1995); Poof Toy Prod., Inc. v. United States Fidelity & Guar. Co., 
891 
F. Supp. 1228 (E.D. Mich. 1995). 
 
5. See, e.g., Simply Fresh Fruit, Inc. v. Continental Ins. Co., 94 F.3d 
1219 
(9th Cir. 1996); Sentex Sys. Inc. v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 882 
F. Supp. 930 (C.D. Cal. 1995), aff'd, 93 F.3d 578 (9th Cir. 1996). 
 
6. See, e.g., Granite State Ins. Co. v. Aamco Transmissions, Inc., 57 F.3d 
316 (3d Cir. 1995). 
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Advance Watch Co., Ltd. v. Kemper National Insurance Co., 
99 F.3d 795 (6th Cir. 1996), on which defendants rely. 
Advance Watch held that, where an insurance policy 
identifies specific language-based torts, unmentioned 
product-based violations cannot be thought reasonably to 
be within the same category. See id. at 804. Advance Watch 
held, specifically, that trademark infringement was not 
covered by the standard policy because there was no 
specific reference to trademark infringement. Because 
trademark litigation is a common and distinct category of 
lawsuit, the court found that if the insurer had intended to 
provide coverage it would have referred to trademarks by 
name, as it did with copyright. See id. at 803. The insurers 
urge us to adopt this reasoning with respect to the trade 
secret misappropriation and Lanham Act claims in this 
case. 
 
Advance Watch has been sharply criticized for ignoring 
the real contours of intellectual property litigation, which 
often proceeds under a bewildering variety of different 
labels covering the same material facts. See, e.g., Industrial 
Molding Corp. v. American Manufacturers Mut. Ins. Co., 17 
F. Supp. 2d 633, 639 (N.D. Tex. 1998). It may also stand in 
some tension with our decision in Granite State Insurance 
Co. v. Aamco Transmissions, Inc., 57 F.3d 316 (3d Cir. 
1995), which declares that insurance policies governed by 
Pennsylvania law will be interpreted according to a 
reasonable insured's understanding rather than the narrow 
legal meaning of policy terms. Without passing on the 
merits of Advance Watch under Pennsylvania law, we 
conclude that Frog's alleged conduct does not fall within a 
reasonable insured's understanding of "misappropriation of 
advertising ideas or style of doing business." 
 
Frog relies on Sentex Systems, Inc. v. Hartford Accident & 
Indemnity Co., 882 F. Supp. 930 (C.D. Cal. 1995), aff'd, 93 
F.3d 578 (9th Cir. 1996), in which there were similar 
allegations of misappropriation of trade secrets and other 
confidential information and use of those secrets to 
promote the insured's security systems in competition with 
the underlying plaintiff. The Sentex court held that the 
phrase "misappropriation of advertising ideas or style of 
doing business," broadly construed, encompassed the 
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common law tort of unfair competition, which the 
underlying plaintiff had alleged. 
 
The defendants properly point out that the Court of 
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed only after expressing 
its unease with the breadth of the district court's holding 
and emphasized that the insured was alleged to have 
misappropriated a customer list, methods of bidding jobs, 
billing methods and procedures, and marketing techniques, 
all of which it exploited to gain new business. The appellate 
court found that "[i]t is significant that[the] claims for 
misappropriation of trade secrets relate to marketing and 
sales and not to secrets relating to the manufacture and 
production of security systems." Sentex Sys., Inc. v. 
Hartford Acc. & Indem. Co., 93 F.3d 578, 580 (9th Cir. 
1996). We would agree. Here, by contrast, the complaint 
does not allege that Frog misappropriated methods of 
gaining customers; it alleges that Frog misappropriated 
information about the manufacture of dipper buckets and 
then advertised the resulting product. 
 
The insurers' basic point is that, to be covered by the 
policy, allegations of unfair competition or misappropriation 
have to involve an advertising idea, not just a non- 
advertising idea that is made the subject of advertising. See 
Atlantic Mut. Ins. Co. v. Badger Med. Supply Co., 528 
N.W.2d 486, 490 (Wis. Ct. App. 1995) (an advertising idea 
is an "idea for calling public attention to a product or 
business, especially by proclaiming desirable qualities so as 
to increase sales or patronage"). As one court put it, "the 
broadest reading of misappropriating advertising ideas is 
that the insured wrongfully take an idea about the 
solicitation of business." Winklevoss Consultants, Inc. v. 
Federal Ins. Co., 991 F. Supp. 1024 (N.D. Ill. 1998). 
 
Thus, while some causes of action for unfair competition, 
theft of trade secrets, or misappropriation may be covered 
by the standard policy, many are not. See, e.g., Winklevoss, 
991 F. Supp. at 1026, 1039 (insured allegedly 
misappropriated software program and promoted resulting 
product to underlying plaintiff 's customers; claim for 
coverage rejected because the trade secret taken did not 
relate to how a product was advertised); GAF Sales & Serv., 
Inc. v. Hastings Mut. Ins. Co., 588 N.W.2d 165 (Mich. Ct. 
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App. 1997) (rejecting claim for coverage for defense against 
trade secret litigation where the misappropriated materials 
did not relate to advertising). The allegation that Frog 
engaged in unfair competition by misappropriating trade 
secrets relating to manufacture of a product line does not 
allege misappropriation of advertising ideas or styles of 
doing business as such. 
 
Frog rejoins that, even if the initial unfair competition 
allegations were insufficient to trigger a duty to defend, the 
Second Amended Complaint's Lanham Act allegations did 
so. Decisionone Corp. v. ITT Hartford Insurance Group, 942 
F. Supp. 1038 (E.D. Pa. 1996), found a duty to defend 
when the underlying plaintiff alleged that the insured 
falsely designated the source of its ability to maintain the 
plaintiff's equipment and falsely advertised that it could 
maintain the plaintiff's equipment, all in violation of the 
Lanham Act. 
 
As the insurers note, however, in Decisionone the 
underlying complaint alleged that the insured made 
derogatory statements about the underlying plaintiff's own 
products, thus stating a cause of action for 
"disparagement," which was covered as advertising injury 
by a separate part of the standard policy. By contrast, 
nothing in Amsco's complaints alleged that Frog said 
anything disparaging about Amsco's products. See also 
Microtec Research, Inc. v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 40 F.3d 
968, 971 (9th Cir. 1994) (rejecting coverage for a reverse 
passing off claim because "[t]he complaint alleged that 
Microtec passed off code created by Green Hills as though 
Microtec had written it, not that Microtec made disparaging 
statements about Green Hills . . ."); cf. Electrographics Int'l 
Corp. v. Federal Ins. Co., No. 98-3220, 1998 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 14685 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 21, 1998) (finding potential 
coverage where the underlying complaint alleged that the 
Lanham Act violations involved misrepresentations"related 
to the nature of both parties' products"). 
 
Frog emphasizes the Second Amended Complaint's 
reverse passing off claim. In Union Insurance Co. v. Knife 
Co., 897 F. Supp. 1213 (W.D. Ark. 1995), the underlying 
plaintiff alleged that the insured passed off its own 
products as the plaintiff 's, infringing on the plaintiff's 
 
                                10 
 
 
trademark. The court held that passing off constitutes 
"misappropriation of advertising ideas or style of business." 
See also Poof Toy Prods., Inc. v. U.S.F.&G., 891 F. Supp. 
1228 (E.D. Mich. 1995) (same). Similarly, Dogloo, Inc. v. 
Northern Ins. Co., 907 F. Supp. 1383 (C.D. Cal. 1995), held 
that allegations that the insured misappropriated trade 
secrets in a doghouse design fit "squarely" within the policy 
language. The "advertising idea or style of doing business" 
misappropriated was manufacturing, advertising, and 
selling a dome-shaped doghouse. See id. at 1390; see also 
Elcom Tech., Inc. v. Hartford Ins. Co., 991 F. Supp. 1294 (D. 
Utah 1997) (where there were only two companies in afield, 
and one company advertised that it had the only patented 
technology for the product, allegations that the other falsely 
advertised that it had the only patented technology 
sufficiently alleged misappropriation of a style of doing 
business to trigger the insurer's duty to defend); P.J. Noyes 
Co. v. American Motorists Ins. Co., 855 F. Supp. 492, 494- 
95 (D.N.H. 1994) (allegation that the insured used the 
name "Dustfree Precision Pellets" arguably falls within 
misappropriation of advertising ideas or style of doing 
business where the underlying plaintiff alleged that it used 
similar words to mark its products). 
 
We will assume for the sake of argument that trademark 
infringement is "misappropriation of an advertising idea or 
style of doing business" under Pennsylvania law. 7 Even so, 
trademark infringement differs from the allegations in 
ESCO's complaint. A trademark can be seen as an 
"advertising idea": It is a way of marking goods so that they 
will be identified with a particular source. See Northam 
Warren Corp. v. Universal Cosmetic Co., 18 F.2d 774, 774 
(7th Cir. 1927) ("A trademark is but a species of 
advertising, its purpose being to fix the identity of the 
article and the name of the producer in the minds of people 
who see the advertisement . . . ."). A trademark depends for 
its effectiveness on communicating a message to consumers 
about the marked good, which is the essence of advertising, 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
7. Recent dicta from the Pennsylvania Superior Court suggests this to be 
the case. See Sorbee Int'l Ltd. v. Chubb Custom Ins. Co., No. 2314 
Philadelphia 1998, 1999 WL 512077, at *4 & n.2 (Pa. Super. July 21, 
1999). 
 
                                11 
 
 
and therefore allegations of trademark infringement 
arguably allege misappropriation of an advertising idea. 
See, e.g., Industrial Molding Corp., 17 F. Supp. 2d at 637-38 
(citing cases to show that this is the majority position). 
 
Knife, Dogloo, and the other "passing off " cases all 
involved allegations that an insured was trading on the 
recognizable name, mark, or product configuration (trade 
dress) of the underlying plaintiff. In this case, however, the 
underlying complaint does not allege that what the insured 
took was itself an idea about identifying oneself to 
customers. The complaint did not allege that the 
misappropriated dipper bucket design served as an 
indication of origin, or that ESCO/Amsco's identifying 
marks were misused. Nor did ESCO allege that Frog took 
an idea about advertising dipper buckets (the idea of 
claiming a revolutionary new design as an enticement to 
customers); it alleged that Frog took the dipper bucket 
design itself and lied about the design's origin. See Applied 
Bolting Technology Prods., Inc. v. United States Fidelity & 
Guarantee Co., 942 F. Supp. 1029, 1034 (E.D. Pa. 1996) 
(making the distinction between taking an advertising idea 
and advertising falsely), aff'd without opinion, 118 F.3d 
1574 (3d Cir. 1997); see also Sorbee Int'l Ltd. v. Chubb 
Custom Ins. Co., No. 2314 Philadelphia 1998, 1999 WL 
512077, at *5 (Pa. Super. July 21, 1999) (making the 
distinction between "misuse in advertising of any idea" and 
"misappropriation of advertising ideas") (internal quotations 
omitted). 
 
Similarly, ESCO alleged not that Frog copied a style of 
doing business--a plan for interacting with consumers and 
getting their business--but that Frog copied a particular 
product line that might be attractive to consumers. See 
Winklevoss, 991 F. Supp. at 1039 (style of doing business 
involves the "outward appearance or signature of a 
business," while a claim for theft of trade secrets involved 
"the theft of [the underlying plaintiff 's] products' inner 
workings, not their outward appearance"); Applied Bolting 
Technology, 942 F. Supp. at 1033-34 (a single product from 
a product line is not a style of doing business). 
 
We predict that, regardless of how Pennsylvania law 
would treat allegations of trademark infringement, 
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Pennsylvania courts would not find that the allegations in 
this case fall within a reasonable understanding of the 
policy terms. Thus, the District Court was correct that the 
underlying complaint did not allege an advertising injury. 
Because of our resolution of this issue, we need not 
address the insurers' argument that there was no causal 
connection between Frog's advertising activity and ESCO's 
alleged injuries.8 We also need not address Travelers's 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
8. We note, however, that there is much confusion in the caselaw 
concerning when an "advertising injury" is"caused" by advertising within 
the meaning of standard business insurance policies. As a reading of the 
briefs in this case reflects, many courts have conflated the requirement 
of "advertising injury" as defined in the standard policy with the 
requirement that the injury occur in the course of advertising, with the 
unfortunate result that they have distorted standard causation 
principles. See, e.g., Novell, Inc. v. Federal Ins. Co., 141 F.3d 983 
(10th 
Cir. 1998). Thus, the courts reach the correct result that an injury was 
not "advertising injury" and then reason, incorrectly (and unnecessarily), 
that the advertising did not cause the injury. 
 
For example, suppose the underlying complaint alleges patent 
infringement, and alleges that the plaintiff lost sales because the 
insured 
aggressively advertised the infringing product. Standard tort principles 
(not to mention common sense) tell us that the advertising was a cause 
in fact of at least a portion of the plaintiff 's damages. Courts that 
reason 
that the injury could have taken place without the advertising, see 
Simply Fresh Fruit, Inc. v. Continental Ins. Co., 94 F.3d 1219, 1222 (9th 
Cir. 1996), are misstating the relevant tort liability principles, which 
ask 
whether the advertising did in fact contribute materially to the injury. 
Similarly, courts that hold that, as a matter of law, advertising a 
misappropriated product is merely "coincidental," are not confronting the 
causal connection between advertising and harm. See Fluoroware, Inc. v. 
Chubb Group of Ins. Cos., 545 N.W.2d 678, 682 (Minn. 1996). 
 
Some courts have solved the problem by requiring that the injury be 
complete in the advertisement, requiring no further conduct. See, e.g., 
Cahill v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 80 F.3d 336, 339 n.3 (9th Cir. 1996) 
(discussing the California approach); Dogloo, 907 F. Supp. at 1390 ("The 
cases . . . illustrate that advertising injury coverage does not extend to 
cases in which advertising alone is not actionable."). We believe that 
this 
formulation is a reasonable way to limit the scope of causation. Thus, if 
an advertisement invaded a person's privacy (causing an advertising 
injury), and the insured's product also invaded a person's privacy 
(causing an advertising injury), the advertisement would cause part of 
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argument that various policy exclusions preclude Frog's 
suit. Finally, we reject in the margin Frog's claim for bad 
faith denial of coverage.9 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
the total harm and would constitute a complete tort in itself. In such a 
case, we think that there would be a duty to defend. See id. The duty to 
indemnify, however, would be limited to the harm caused by the 
advertisement. 
 
At all events, the belt-and-suspenders approach to denying coverage is, 
in this case, unnecessary. Causation alone does not equate to insurance 
coverage. Perhaps courts have failed to engage in rigorous causation 
analysis in many cases because they have already found that there is no 
advertising injury. Indeed, we have found no actual case in which a 
court has found "advertising injury" but not causation. Cf. International 
Communication Materials, Inc. v. Employer's Ins., No. 94-1789, 1996 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 21825 (W.D. Pa. May 29, 1996) (finding that, where the 
policy listed patent infringement under the definition of "advertising 
injury," there was a genuine issue of material fact regarding whether the 
infringement caused harm in the course of advertising). While Amsco's 
underlying complaint specifically alleges that Frog's advertising 
contributed to its injuries, thus sufficiently alleging a causal 
connection 
between the advertising and the injury, that is not enough to trigger the 
insurers' duty to defend. 
 
9. A refusal, with no good cause, to provide a defense or to indemnify 
when the policy provides for coverage violates Pennsylvania's bad faith 
insurance statute. See 42 Pa. Stat. Ann.S 8371 (creating a remedy "if 
the court finds that the insurer has acted in bad faith towards the 
insured"). Bad faith is a frivolous or unfounded refusal to pay, lack of 
investigation into the facts, or a failure to communicate with the 
insured. 
See Coyne v. Allstate Ins. Co., 771 F. Supp. 673, 678 (E.D. Pa. 1991) 
(bad faith is failure to acknowledge or act promptly on the claims, or 
refusing to pay without reasonable investigation of all available 
information); Romano v. Nationwide Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 646 A.2d 1228 
(Pa. Super. Ct. 1994). Good faith is no defense if there was in fact no 
good cause to refuse coverage. See Gedean v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. 
Co., 188 A.2d 320, 322 n.4 (Pa. 1963). However, mere negligence or bad 
judgment does not constitute bad faith; knowledge or reckless disregard 
of a lack of a basis for denial of coverage is necessary. Winner 
International Corp. v. Continental Casualty Co., 889 F. Supp. 809 (W.D. 
Pa. 1994), aff 'd without opinion, 54 F.3d 767 (3d Cir. 1995). 
 
The District Court reasoned that bad faith claims cannot survive a 
determination that there was no duty to defend, because the court's 
determination that there was no potential coverage means that the 
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insurer had good cause to refuse to defend. See Lucker Mfg. v. Home Ins. 
Co., 23 F.3d 808, 821 n.19 (3d Cir. 1994); Hyde Ath. Indus., Inc. v. 
Continental Cas. Co., 969 F. Supp. 289, 306 (E.D. Pa. 1997). 
 
Frog argues that a bad faith claim is not contingent on success on the 
underlying breach of contract claim, citing Doylestown Electric Supply 
Co. v. Maryland Casualty Insurance Co., 942 F. Supp. 1018, 1020 (E.D. 
Pa. 1996). But that case involved a situation in which the statute of 
limitations had expired on the breach of contract claim; a breach of a 
duty to defend was unredressable for procedural reasons, but it was still 
possible that a bad faith claim could succeed. Here, where there was no 
duty to defend, there was good cause to refuse to defend against a suit. 
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